Nudging Cooperation in a Crowd Experiment

We examine the hypothesis that driven by a competition heuristic, people don't even reflect or consider whether a cooperation strategy may be better. As a paradigmatic example of this behavior we propose the zero-sum game fallacy, according to which people believe that resources are fixed even when they are not. We demonstrate that people only cooperate if the competitive heuristic is explicitly overridden in an experiment in which participants play two rounds of a game in which competition is suboptimal. The observed spontaneous behavior for most players was to compete. Then participants were explicitly reminded that the competing strategy may not be optimal. This minor intervention boosted cooperation, implying that competition does not result from lack of trust or willingness to cooperate but instead from the inability to inhibit the competition bias. This activity was performed in a controlled laboratory setting and also as a crowd experiment. Understanding the psychological underpinnings of these behaviors may help us improve cooperation and thus may have vast practical consequences to our society.Fil: Niella, Tamara. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; ArgentinaFil: Stier, Nicolas. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; ArgentinaFil: Sigman, Mariano. Universidad Torcuato di Tella; Argentina. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas; Argentin

Time preferences and risk aversion: tests on domain differences

The design and evaluation of environmental policy requires the incorporation of time and risk elements as many environmental outcomes extend over long time periods and involve a large degree of uncertainty. Understanding how individuals discount and evaluate risks with respect to environmental outcomes is a prime component in designing effective environmental policy to address issues of environmental sustainability, such as climate change. Our objective in this study is to investigate whether subjects' time preferences and risk aversion across the monetary domain and the environmental domain differ. Crucially, our experimental design is incentivized: in the monetary domain, time preferences and risk aversion are elicited with real monetary payoffs, whereas in the environmental domain, we elicit time preferences and risk aversion using real (bee-friendly) plants. We find that subjects' time preferences are not significantly different across the monetary and environmental domains. In contrast, subjects' risk aversion is significantly different across the two domains. More specifically, subjects (men and women) exhibit a higher degree of risk aversion in the environmental domain relative to the monetary domain. Finally, we corroborate earlier results, which document that women are more risk averse than men in the monetary domain. We show this finding to, also, hold in the environmental domain

On reminder effects, drop-outs and dominance: evidence from an online experiment on charitable giving

We present the results of an experiment that (a) shows the usefulness of screening out drop-outs and (b) tests whether different methods of payment and reminder intervals affect charitable giving. Following a lab session, participants could make online donations to charity for a total duration of three months. Our procedure justifying the exclusion of drop-outs consists in requiring participants to collect payments in person flexibly and as known in advance and as highlighted to them later. Our interpretation is that participants who failed to collect their positive payments under these circumstances are likely not to satisfy dominance. If we restrict the sample to subjects who did not drop out, but not otherwise, reminders significantly increase the overall amount of charitable giving. We also find that weekly reminders are no more effective than monthly reminders in increasing charitable giving, and that, in our three months duration experiment, standing orders do not increase giving relative to one-off donations

Make-up and suspicion in bargaining with cheap talk: An experiment controlling for gender and gender constellation

This paper explores gender differences in "make- up" and "suspicion" in a bargaining game in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then pro- poses a price for the company. "Make-up" is measured by how much the true value is overstated, "suspicion" by how much the price offer differs from the value message. We run different computerized treat- ments varying in information about the gender (constellation) and in embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry of the game and of information allows for a robust assessment of gender (constellation) effects. We report here the results from just one shot round decision since we expect such effects to be more pronounced for inexperienced participants. We mainly find an effect of gender constellation: when fe- male sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more, i.e. there is more "make-up". However, we cannot confirm gender (con- stellation) effects for suspicion.This paper explores gender differences in "make-up" and "suspicion" in a bargaining game in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. "Make-up" is measured by how much the true value is overstated, "suspicion" by how much the price offer differs from the value message. We run different computerized treatments varying in information about the gender (constellation) and in embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry of the game and of information allows for a robust assessment of gender (constellation) effects. We report here the results from just one shot round decision since we expect such effects to be more pronounced for inexperienced participants. We mainly find an effect of gender constellation: when female sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more, i.e. there is more "make-up". However, we cannot confirm gender (constellation) effects for suspicion

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Group-level selection increases cooperation in the public goods game

When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation

Predicting Decisions in Human Social Interactions Using Real-Time fMRI and Pattern Classification

Negotiation and trade typically require a mutual interaction while simultaneously resting in uncertainty which decision the partner ultimately will make at the end of the process. Assessing already during the negotiation in which direction one's counterpart tends would provide a tremendous advantage. Recently, neuroimaging techniques combined with multivariate pattern classification of the acquired data have made it possible to discriminate subjective states of mind on the basis of their neuronal activation signature. However, to enable an online-assessment of the participant's mind state both approaches need to be extended to a real-time technique. By combining real-time functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and online pattern classification techniques, we show that it is possible to predict human behavior during social interaction before the interacting partner communicates a specific decision. Average accuracy reached approximately 70% when we predicted online the decisions of volunteers playing the ultimatum game, a well-known paradigm in economic game theory. Our results demonstrate the successful online analysis of complex emotional and cognitive states using real-time fMRI, which will enable a major breakthrough for social fMRI by providing information about mental states of partners already during the mutual interaction. Interestingly, an additional whole brain classification across subjects confirmed the online results: anterior insula, ventral striatum, and lateral orbitofrontal cortex, known to act in emotional self-regulation and reward processing for adjustment of behavior, appeared to be strong determinants of later overt behavior in the ultimatum game. Using whole brain classification we were also able to discriminate between brain processes related to subjective emotional and motivational states and brain processes related to the evaluation of objective financial incentives

The emergence of altruism as a social norm

Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even when they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectation after playing a DG by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many strategic interactions

Action Being Character: A Promising Perspective on the Solution Concept of Game Theory

The inconsistency of predictions from solution concepts of conventional game theory with experimental observations is an enduring question. These solution concepts are based on the canonical rationality assumption that people are exclusively self-regarding utility maximizers. In this article, we think this assumption is problematic and, instead, assume that rational economic agents act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, which turns out to be a natural extension of the canonical rationality assumption. Implicit utility is defined by a player's character to reflect his personal weighting between cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social value orientations. The player who actually faces an implicit game chooses his strategy based on the common belief about the character distribution for a general player and the self-estimation of his own character, and he is not concerned about which strategies other players will choose and will never feel regret about his decision. It is shown by solving five paradigmatic games, the Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the Public Goods game, and the Battle of the Sexes game, that the framework of implicit game and its corresponding solution concept, implicit equilibrium, based on this alternative assumption have potential for better explaining people's actual behaviors in social decision making situations

An evaluation of the performance in the UK Royal College of Anaesthetists primary examination by UK medical school and gender

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>There has been comparatively little consideration of the impact that the changes to undergraduate curricula might have on postgraduate academic performance. This study compares the performance of graduates by UK medical school and gender in the Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) section of the first part of the Fellowship of the Royal College of Anaesthetists (FRCA) examination.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>Data from each sitting of the MCQ section of the primary FRCA examination from June 1999 to May 2008 were analysed for performance by medical school and gender.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>There were 4983 attempts at the MCQ part of the examination by 3303 graduates from the 19 United Kingdom medical schools. Using the standardised overall mark minus the pass mark graduates from five medical schools performed significantly better than the mean for the group and five schools performed significantly worse than the mean for the group. Males performed significantly better than females in all aspects of the MCQ – physiology, mean difference = 3.0% (95% CI 2.3, 3.7), p < 0.001; pharmacology, mean difference = 1.7% (95% CI 1.0, 2.3), p < 0.001; physics with clinical measurement, mean difference = 3.5% (95% CI 2.8, 4.1), p < 0.001; overall mark, mean difference = 2.7% (95% CI 2.1, 3.3), p < 0.001; and standardised overall mark minus the pass mark, mean difference = 2.5% (95% CI 1.9, 3.1), p < 0.001. Graduates from three medical schools that have undergone the change from Traditional to Problem Based Learning curricula did not show any change in performance in any aspects of the MCQ pre and post curriculum change.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Graduates from each of the medical schools in the UK do show differences in performance in the MCQ section of the primary FRCA, but significant curriculum change does not lead to deterioration in post graduate examination performance. Whilst females now outnumber males taking the MCQ, they are not performing as well as the males.</p